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Punitive damages' are awarded against a tortfeasor primarily to
punish his behavior and deter others from similar conduct. 2 If these
goals are to be furthered then the tortfeasor should be foreclosed
from escaping personal liability through insurance.' Nevertheless,
the majority of courts permit coverage when the tortious conduct is
otherwise insurable.4 These holdings are based on liberal construc-
tion of the insurance contract 5 and on a belief that punitive damages
are not an effective means to punish or deter outrageous conduct.
6
The purpose of this note is to examine the rationales surrounding
this insurability question and to suggest the most plausible approach
to be followed by the courts.
* David A. Sprentall, BA, 1975 Allegheny College; JD, 1979 Dickinson School of Law;
Associate, Streppa, Osgood, Cleary, Persons & Gaenzle, Rochester, N.Y. Member, New York
State Bar.
1. According to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979):
(1) Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others from similar conduct in the future.
(2) Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assess-
ing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the
defendant's act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant
caused or intended to cause and the wealth of the defendant.
2. Id The theory of punitive damages has been criticized as an improper function of
tort law, see, e.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES
(1969).
3. See notes 52-57 and accompanying text infra.
4. The most recent cases are: Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485,
502 P.2d 522 (1972); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d
582 (1969); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511
P.2d 783 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974); First Nat'l Bank
of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978); Harrell v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.,
214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d I (1964); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d
341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., _ Vt. _, 404 A.2d 101 (1979); Cies-
lewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
5. See notes 19-50 and accompanying text infra.
6. See notes 58-77 and accompanying text infra.
II. Background
A. The Scope of Punitive Damages
Punitive damages may be awarded, over and above compensa-
tory damages, in an amount sufficient to punish the defendant's con-
duct and to deter others.7 The types of activities that merit such an
award vary. Punitive damages may be awarded when the defendant
commits an intentional tort shown to be "aggravated by evil motive,
actual malice, deliberate violence, or oppression."8  A punitive
award may also be made when malice is inferred, as in a malicious
prosecution case in which the defendant is found to have lacked
probable cause for his actions.9 Other courts have allowed punitive
damages for an act of gross recklessness, such as driving while intox-
icated, which exhibits a wanton disregard for safety but lacks a spe-
cific intent to cause harm.'0 Generally, however, simple negligence,
without more, is insufficient to support an award of punitive dam-
ages. "
B. The Scope of Liability Insurance
As a general rule liability coverage excludes "intentional inju-
ries."' 12 This rule may result from an express limitation in the pol-
icy,' 3 or from public policy considerations.'4 Whether express or
implied, however, this exclusion does not limit coverage only to lia-
bility resulting from negligent acts. In most insurance policies an
intentional injury is defined as one in which, from the insured's
standpoint some harm is intended or certain to result.' Thus, an
assault and battery would fall within the exclusion, while extreme
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908, Comment a (1979).
8. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 47 F.R.D. 263, 271 (D.D.C. 1969).
9. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 248,
389 A.2d 359, 369 (1978) (Levine, J., dissenting).
10. See Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 137, 508 P.2d 211(1973). Cf Ross v. Clark, 35 Ariz. 60,
68, 274 P. 639, 642 (1929) (allowing punitive damages for gross negligence); Focht v. Rabada,
217 Pa. Super. Ct. 35, 368 A.2d 157 (1970) (punitive damages for wilful and wanton conduct).
See also Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
In order for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in Missouri, he must prove mal-
ice, either actual or legal. In actual malice, the action is motivated by hatred or ill
will. Legal malice is the intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse in reckless disregard of the rights of others.
Id
11. Gordon v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 62 Misc. 2d 689, 309 N.Y.S.2d 420 (Sup. Ct.
1970), af'd, 37 App. Div. 2d 265, 323 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1971).
12. Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, _ 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973).
13. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Muth, 109 Neb. 248, 207 N.W.2d 364 (1973).
14. If there is no exclusion in the policy, intentional injuries may be covered if coverage
would not encourage the conduct or if the insurer may be subrogated against the insured.
Compare Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 484, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (1978) and Wolff
v. General Cas. Co. of America, 68 N.M. 292, 361 P.2d 330 (1961), with New Jersey Mfr's Ins.
Co. v. Brower, 161 N.J. Super. 293, 300, 391 A.2d 923, 927 (1978).
15. See Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 21-22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Muth, 190 Neb. 248, _, 207 N.W.2d 364, 366 (1973).
recklessness, exhibiting wanton disregard for safety but no intent to
harm, might not. 6 Since punitive damages are not limited to cases
in which harm was intended, and one may insure for more than
mere negligence, cases arise in which an insured's liability insurance
could cover a judgment including punitive damages.' 7
Such claims for coverage for punitive damages arise commonly
in automobile negligence cases involving charges of wilful and wan-
ton conduct due to defendant's alleged intoxication.'8 When an in-
sured defendant seeks coverage under those circumstances, the court
may be faced with two questions: first, does the insurance contract
include coverage for punitive damages; and second, is such coverage
against public policy?
III Contract Interpretation
Courts are split on whether a standard liability policy should be
read to include coverage for punitive damages.' 9 Courts must usu-
ally deal with policies that read substantially as follows:
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of
A. bodily injury or
B. property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence, and aris-
ing out of the ownership, maintenance or use. . . of any automo-
bile .... 20
16. Pennsylvania Thresherman & Farmers Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton, 244 F.2d 823,
827 (4th Cir. 1957).
17. Id In Thornton the court stated the following:
Negligent conduct may be so gross as to permit characterization as willful and wan-
ton in the sense of the rule for punitive damages, yet fall far short of an assault and
battery which would distinguish it from an accidental event and withdraw it from the
coverage of the policy. Punitive damages are not limited to assaults and batteries,
and the award of such damages does not convert the case into an assault and battery.
Id
18. See Annot. 65 A.L.R.3d 656 (1975).
19. Coverage denied: Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776
(1934); Gleason v. Fryer, 491 P.2d 85 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur.
Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, _ 213 N.W.2d
327, 331 (1973). The number of cases that deny contractual coverage is limited because a
number of courts do not reach this question and deny coverage on public policy grounds in-
stead. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 434 (5th Cir. 1962).
Coverage granted: General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 228 F.2d 452, 457-58 (6th
Cir. 1956); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1934); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp.
92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal.
1943); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, _ 440 S.w.2d 582, 584
(1969); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910
(1977); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States Fidelity Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511
P.2d 783, 789 (1973); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 11. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.w 2d 146, 152 (Ky. 1974); Harrell v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 279 Or. 199, -, 567 P.2d 1013, 1014-15 (1977); Morrell v. Lalonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435
(1923), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 572 (1923); Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908
(1965); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,__ Vt. - 404 A.2d 101 (1979); Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv.
Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 98, 267 N.W.2d 595, 597-98 (1978).
20. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW 658 (1971) (emphasis added). The
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For purposes of determining whether coverage extends to punitive
damages, courts focus on the phrases "all sums" and "because of
bodily injury."'"
A. Cases Holding that Liability Policies do not Cover Punitive
Damages
Some courts reason that the phrase "because of bodily injury"
requires a nexus between the defendant's liability and some physical
harm suffered by plaintiff for coverage to exist. Thus, sums paid by
the defendant to compensate the injured plaintiff are covered. On
the other hand, this nexus is absent in the case of punitive damages,
which are awarded to punish a defendant's conduct rather than to
make the plaintiff whole.22 Under this rationale punitive damages
are, therefore, found to be impliedly excluded from coverage under
the standard liability policy.23
This approach seems logical and is supported by commenta-
tors,24 but two difficulties exist. First, such a narrow and conserva-
tive reading ignores possible ambiguities in the policy created by the
reference to "all sums."25 Second, and more important, these courts
fail to deal with the reasonable expectations of the insured,26 an issue
that has been determinative in other areas of insurance law.2 7
B. Cases Holding that Liability Policies Cover Punitive Damages
The majority of courts construe liability policies to cover awards
of punitive damages. While some of these cases may be distin-
guished because of the policy language, 8 most cases deal with the
standard liability clause cited at the beginning of this section. Three
rationales are expressed or implicit in the cases that find coverage:
first, the policy unambiguously covers punitive damages; second, the
policy is ambiguous and should therefore be construed in favor of
term occurrence as used in this policy means an accident in which the injury was unexpected
and unintended. Id at 654. See also State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., _ Vt. _ 404 A. 2d 101,
105 (1979).
21. For simplicity the words "or property damage" will be omitted.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. See, e.g., Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
24. See, e.g., Anderson, Indemnity Against Punitive Damages: An Examination of Punitive
Damages, Their Purpose, Public Policy, and the Coverage Provisions of the Texas Standard Au-
tomobile Liability Insurance Policy, 27 Sw. L.J. 593, 616-19 (1973); Comment, Insurancefor
Punitive Damages: .4 Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 436-39 (1976).
25. See notes 34-40 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 41-50 and accompanying text infra.
27. See, e.g., C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176-79 (Iowa
1975). See notes 41-50 and accompanying text infra.
28. In Colson v. Lloyds of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968), for example, the
policy in question insured against "loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon the insured
by reason of any false arrest. . . ." and there was no reference to bodily injury. Id at 46-47.
the insured; or third, the policy should be liberally construed in ac-
cordance with the expectations of the insured.
1. Unambiguous Coverage.-Several courts have focused on
the words "all sums" rather than the phrase "because of bodily in-
jury" in order to avoid ambiguity and provide coverage for punitive
damages. In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemniy Co.,29 for example, a United States District Court, quot-
ing policy language defining sums the insured was obligated to pay
"because of. . .bodily injury," 30 stated, "The contract covers 'all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay.' "31
From this characterization of the policy the court concluded,
The policy unambiguously covers "all sums." Punitive damages
are a form of damages; when liquidated by judgment, they are a
"sum." Thus, this contract does not even present such an ambigu-
ity as would call into play the rule that ambiguities in insurance
contracts should be resolved in favor of the insured.32
Even if this court correctly included punitive damages within the
policy, it clearly ignored the real issue: whether the phrase "because
of bodily injury" restricts "all sums" to compensatory damages.33
2. Ambiguous Coverage.-Other courts have included punitive
damages in liability coverage on the theory that the policy language
is ambiguous and therefore should be construed in favor of the in-
sured. The exact nature of the ambiguity relied on, however, is often
difficult to discern. In Carroway v. Johnson,34 for example, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina stated, "[W]here the words of the
policy are ambiguous, or where they are capable of two reasoned
interpretations, that construction will be adopted which is most
favorable to the insured. ' 35 The court then held that punitive dam-
ages were covered but never defined the ambiguity it relied upon to
construe the policy in favor of the insured.
Other courts, focusing on the phrase "because of bodily injury,"
have indicated the grounds upon which a claim of ambiguity or
double meaning could rest. In Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Insurance
Co.,3 6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated,
It is the infliction of bodily injury which gives rise to the
29. 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
30. Id at 93.
31. Id at 94 n.l.
32. Id Accord Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ind. 1978).
33. See also General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452, 457-58 (6th Cir.
1956); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16, 19 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Scott v.
Instant Parking, Inc., 105 I11. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. 1974); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., __ Vt. _, 404 A.2d 101, 105
(1979).
34. 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
35. Id at -., 139 S.E.2d at 909.
36. 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
cause of action. Once the cause of action arises, punitive or multi-
ple damages are awarded in connection with, or because of, the
injuries incurred.37
This approach recognizes that there is no cause of action for the
conduct of the defendant standing alone;38 only after some tort is
alleged can an action be brought. To plead a tort, plaintiff must al-
lege that he suffered damages, which might include bodily injury.
Only when damages, together with the other tort elements, are
shown, can plaintiff seek a punitive award. Thus, whenever the
plaintiffs damages arise from bodily injury an additional prayer for
punitive damages is made "in connection with" or "because of' the
bodily injury.39 At the very least, this approach suggests that the
meaning of the phrase "because of bodily injury" is unclear and that
the addition of the phrase "all sums" merely serves to further com-
plicate interpretation of the policy.4"
3. Expectations of the Insured.-Although attention to the de-
tails of the policy language becomes mired in semantics, some courts
seek to define coverage by asking: What did the insured reasonably
expect his coverage to be?41 This approach recognizes that an insur-
ance policy is an adhesion contract that the insured may not even see
until after the "bargain" is struck.42 Thus, "the insured is justified in
assuming that the policy which is delivered to him has been faith-
fully prepared by the company to provide the protection against the
risk he asked for."
4 3
Based upon this theory, punitive damages might be considered
covered by a "General Liability - Automobile Policy"" or similar
37. Id at 97, 267 N.E.2d at 598; see also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d
58, 59 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1934).
38. See generally Comment, The Relationship of Punitive Damages and Compensatory
Damages in Tort Actions, 75 DICK. L. REV. 585, 591-607 (1971).
39. This argument would be true whether or not the law of the state in question required
an actual damage award as a predicate to punitive damages because the argument is based not
on an award of actual damages, but on the existence of damages upon which a tort may be
alleged in the first instance.
40. Cf., Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849,_ 440 S.W.2d 582,
584 (1969) ("When we consider that under our law, one cannot become legally obligated to
pay punitive damages unless actual damages have been sustained and assessed, we find that
punitive damages constitute a sum which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of bodily injuries sustained ....").
41. Professor Keeton suggests this approach to contract interpretation better explains the
result reached by many courts purporting to apply an ambiguity test. See R. KEETON, supra
note 20, at 357. Indeed, several cases involving claims of ambiguity also suggest reliance on
the purchaser's reasonable expectations. See, e.g., Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or.
199, 567 P.2d 1013, 1015 (1977); Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 98, 267
N.W.2d 595, 598 (1978).
42. R. KEETON, supra note 20, at 350-52.
43. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (quot-
ing 7 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 33-34 (3d ed. W.
Jaeger 1964)).
44. R. KEETON, supra note 20, at 653.
insurance. As one court has stated, "A reasonable person in the po-
sition of the insured would believe that the language of the policy
provides coverage against all civil liability arising out of an occur-
rence resulting in bodily injury."45 Punitive damages certainly fall
under the heading of civil damages, and, given their broad scope,
may be awarded as a result of an occurrence or accident.46 Thus, the
typical insured would expect coverage for punitive damages.47
One response to this approach is "that a person has no right to
expect the law to allow him to place responsibility for his reckless
and wanton acts on someone else."4 8 Taken strictly, this argument
denies the reckless tortfeasor indemnity for compensatory as well as
punitive damages. Assuming, however, only punitive damages are
referred to, the answer to this argument rests with the efficacy of
such awards. In a legal system that values punitive damages as an
important and necessary means to punish and deter, no one could
reasonably expect to obtain insurance coverage. Today, however,
many courts expressly or impliedly exhibit doubt that civil liability
should be used to punish and question whether a punitive award will
deter others.4 9 Under these circumstances even a person trained in
the law might expect coverage for punitive damages and, therefore,
an average person would also reasonably expect coverage for these
damages.5 °
IV. Public Policy Approach
Several courts have held that even if an insurance contract pro-
vides coverage for punitive damages, public policy voids any such
coverage.5' The strength of this policy argument rests not only on an
45. Cieslewiczv. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 98, 267 N.W.2d 595, 598 (1978).
The Supreme Court of Vermont has similarly stated, "[W]e decline to unsettle the insured's
reasonable expectation that 'all sums' means 'all sums.' " State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co.,__ Vt.
_ . 404 A.2d 101, 105 (1979). See also Zuger, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 54
N.D. L. REv. 239 (1976).
46. See notes 7-11 and accompanying text supra. An occurrence or accident is defined as
an event "neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." R. KEETON,
supra note 20, at 654.
47. State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., _ Vt. .. , _, 404 A.2d 101, 105 (1979).
48. Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965).
49. In First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 282 Md. 228, 389 A.2d
359 (1978), the majority opinion exemplifies the belief that punitive damages are ineffective
and therefore insurable. As the dissent noted, "[Tihe Court has sub silentio dealt a death blow
to the theory of exemplary damages applied in Maryland for well over a century." Id at 367
(Levine, J., dissenting). See also note 64 and accompanying text infra.
50. Moreover, to avoid coverage all the insurer need do is insert a clear exclusion of
punitive damages. Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 98, 267 N.W.2d 595,
599 (1978); R. KEETON, supra note 20, at 352.
51. The public policy and contract issues are not always viewed as mutually exclusive.
For example, the reasoning in Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, -_., 39 P.2d
776, 779 (1934), a leading case in the narrow construction of the insurance contract, shows that
the court was influenced by public policy considerations.
analysis of the purposes of punitive damages, but also on several
competing considerations, most notably the policy of freedom of
contract.
A. Rationale that Liability Insurance of Punitive Damages
Contravenes Public Policy
The argument that public policy forbids insurance coverage of
punitive damages was most effectively advanced by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNulty. 52 McNulty had recovered a verdict for $57,500 against
Smith, the insured, for an automobile accident. The damages in-
cluded a $20,000 punitive award based on findings that Smith had
been driving at excessive speeds while intoxicated. McNulty brought
an ancillary garnishment action to recover from Smith's liability car-
rier, and on appeal the company contended that the punitive damage
award was not within the scope of coverage.53
The court first determined that under the applicable state law
punitive damages were intended primarily to punish and deter.54
After distinguishing several earlier cases in which coverage had been
granted,5 5 the court concluded,
The [public] policy considerations in a state where . . . punitive
damages are awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem
to require that the damages rest ultimately as well as nominally on
the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that person were
permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive
damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory dam-
ages already have made the plaintiff whole.
56
Several other jurisdictions follow this approach.57
52. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
53. Id at 433.
54. Id at 434-35. The court applied conflict of laws principles and looked to the law of
Florida for guidance. The court found that the primary purposes of punitive damages in Flor-
ida were punishment and deterrence, although, a secondary compensatory purpose ssemed to
exist. Id at 434.
55. Several cases were distinguishable because the judgments involved lump sum awards
in which compensatory and punitory damages could not be separated. Id at 438. Other cases
were distinguished because of the compensatory nature of punitive damages under state law.
Id at 439. Finally, other cases were found to involve vicarious rather than direct liability. Id.
56. Id at 440.
57. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 526 (10th Cir. 1966); Grant v. North River
Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Ind. 1978); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 95 (N.D. Ind. 1976); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F.
Supp. 257, 261 (D. Conn. 1965); City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31,
151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); City of
Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (1975);
LoRocco v. N.J. Mfr.'s Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964); Esmond v.
Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 212-14, 224 A.2d 793, 799 (1966).
B. Argument that Public Policy Does Not Forbid Insurance for
Punitive Damages
Few courts challenge the premise of McNulty that punitive
damages are meant to punish and deter.58 Beginning with the deci-
sion of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Lazenby v. Universal Under-
writers Insurance Co.,59 however, the public policy argument has
frequently been supplanted by considerations of the general ineffec-
tiveness of punitive damages as a device to punish and deter outra-
geous conduct and by the possibility of adverse effects on society if
insurance is denied.6" While both McNulty and Lazenby have al-
ready received considerable attention from earlier commentators,6'
two recent decisions 62 provide ground for renewed consideration of
the soundness of the public policy argument.
1. Lack of Deterrent Effect.-Lazenby, like McNulty, was an
action brought against an insurance company seeking payment of an
award of punitive damages in an automobile negligence case in
which the insured tortfeasor was intoxicated.63  The court agreed
with the enormity of the problem presented by drunken drivers, but
went on to conclude the following:
We, however, are not able to agree the closing of the insurance
market, on the payment of punitive damages, to such drivers
would necessarily accomplish the result of deterring them in their
wrongful conduct. This State, in regard to the proper operation of
motor vehicles, has a great many detailed criminal sanctions,
which apparently have not deterred this slaughter on our high-
ways and streets. Then to say the closing of the insurance market,
in the payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty
drivers would in our opinion contain some element of specula-
tion. 64
At first glance this argument seems inconsistent; if the court did
not believe that punitive damages serve any purpose, why were they
allowed in the first place? Consistency seems to require that once a
58. Such a challenge would only occur in a state where punitive damages are deemed
compensatory. See, e.g., Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746 (1922) (Michigan allows
punitive damages, but regards them as extra compensation for injured feelings or sense of
outrage rather than as punishment).
59. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
60. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 487, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972); Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, _, 232 S.E.2d 910,
913-14 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,
504-07, 511 P.2d 783, 786-89 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52
(Ky. 1974); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 232-43, 389
A.2d 359, 361-66 (1978); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, _, 567 P.2d 1013, 1016-
17 (1977); State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., _ Vt. _, 404 A.2d 101 (1979).
61. See, e.g., Zuger, supra note 45; Anderson, supra note 24; Comment, supra note 24.
62. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
63. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 641, 383 S.W.2d 1, 2
(1964).
64. Id. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5. See also note 60 supra.
court has determined that a species of conduct justifies a punitive
award, the effect of that award should not be alleviated through in-
surance.65 As the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated in
criticizing Lazenby. "The question is not so much the efficacy of the
policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the
implementation of that policy."66
The result in Lazenby is best explained by comparing the two
standards of proof involved. On one hand, courts tend to resolve
doubts in favor of allowing punitive awards to be made, and strict
proof of deterrent effect is not required.67 Concurrently, however,
courts favor the policy of freedom of contract. Thus, when coverage
for punitive damages is found, strict proof is required to void the
agreement.68
In Harrell v. Ames,69 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court
upheld an award of punitive damages for driving while intoxicated,
even though there was no clear proof that deterrence would result,
stating that,
It may be debatable whether. . . awards of punitive damages...
will effectively deter persons from driving after drinking. How-
ever, in the absence of a showing of substantial evidence to the con-
trary, we are not prepared to hold that law enforcement officials
and courts . . . are wrong in their present apparent assumption
that. . . awards ofX unitive damages may have at least some de-
terrent effect ....
Later, in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity Co. ,7 on the same facts, the
court found that insurance coverage for punitive damages was not
precluded by public policy. Here the court recognized that a con-
tract freely entered into would be upheld unless it reflected an "evil
tendency. '72 Such a tendency was not proved because there was no
evidence that contracts of insurance to protect against liability for
punitive damages have such an "evil tendency" to make reckless
conduct "more probable" or that there [was] any "substantial rela-
tionship" between the fact of such insurance and such misconduct.
Conversely, neither [was] there any such evidence that to invali-
date insurance contract provisions to protect against liability for
65. This is especially true when the jury is instructed to set damages in order to deter.
Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, _, 567 P.2d 1013, 1030 (1977) (Linde, J., dissent-
ing).
66. American Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Gold, 373 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966).
67. See note 70 and accompanying text infra.
68. This state has more than one public policy. Another and countervailing public
policy favors freedom of contract, in the absence of overriding reasons for depriving
the parties of that freedom. Still another public policy favors the enforcement of
insurance contracts according to their terms, where the insurance company accepts
the premium and reasonably represents or implies that coverage is provided.
Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 103, 267 N.W.2d 595, 601 (1978).
69. 265 Or. 137, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).
70. Id at __ 508 P.2d at 215 (emphasis added).
71. 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
72. Id at , 567 P.2d at 1016. The evil tendency test reflects the need to find an over-
powering public policy consideration in order to void the contract. Id
punitive damages on grounds of public policy would have any
substantial "tendency" to make such conduct "less probable," i.e.,
that to do so would have any "deterrent effect" whatever on such
conduct.
73
The Lazenby-HarrelP4 approach is flawed in at least three re-
spects. First, from a purely pragmatic viewpoint wasteful awards are
promoted.75 Second, the courts did not consider whether the interest
in punishing the defendant rather than simply deterring others was
sufficient to overcome the insurance contract. 76 Last, the courts' ba-
sic lack of confidence in the utility of punitive damages was misdi-
rected. The correct approach would be to abrogate the doctrine of
punitive damages rather than to eliminate the utility of punitive
damages through insurance.77
2. Detrimental Consequences of Denying Coverage.-Two re-
cent decisions have considered the burden of punitive damages too
great to be imposed absent insurability.78 In Harrell v. Travelers In-
demnity Co. the court found that a per se rule of noninsurability
"would include a wide spectrum of conduct that would impose lia-
bility not only upon automobile drivers, but also upon business and
professional persons, firms and corporations, as well as upon ordi-
nary persons when engaged in a wide variety of activities."79 To
support this, the court gave examples of punitive awards based on
conduct ranging from gross negligence to implied malice, and upon
statutory treble damages for unlawful trade practices.8 ° As the situa-
tions cited included normal business risks the court concluded a per
se rule of noninsurability would be unsound.8
73. Id at - 567 P.2d at 1017.
74. See also Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522, 524
(1972).
75. See note 139 and accompanying text infra.
76. The court in Harrell probably did not consider the punitory argument because the
jury had been instructed to set the damages based on deterrence alone. 279 Or. at __ 567 P.2d
at 1022-23 (Holman, J., dissenting). In Lazenby, however, the court admitted that the award
was meant to punish and deter, but simply failed to consider the strength of the interest in
punishment. 214 Tenn. at 646-47, 383 S.w.2d at 4-5. In McNully the court concluded, "[Ilt
appears to us that there are especially strong public policy reasons for not allowing socially
irresponsible automobile drivers to escape the element of personal punishment in punitive
damages when they are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming on the highway." 307 F.2d
441. Thus, at least as applied to automobile injury cases the Lazenby-Harrell approach is
seriously deficient because it failed to consider whether the interest in punishing the defendant
was sufficient to overcome the insurance contract.
77. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text infra.
78. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359
(1978); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
79. 279 Or. at _, 567 P.2d at 1018.
80. Id The examples in which Oregon state law allowed punitive damages included
gross negligence by a physician, repossession of property by a creditor in utter disregard of the
plaintiff's rights, false arrest based on a lack of probable cause, industrial pollution done with
intentional disregard of the rights of others, and violations of the Oregon Unlawful Trade
Practices Act.
81. Under the [McNulty] rule . . . even though the risks involved in each of these
examples were of such a nature as to be encountered in the operation of such busi-
ness or professions, and the conduct involved did not involve "intentionally inflicted
In illustration, in Maryland punitive damages are always proper
in a malicious prosecution action because the requisite malice is an
element of the tort itself. Moreover, malice can be inferred from an
objective lack of probable cause.82 Clearly, under this law a defend-
ant could be liable for punitive damages even though his conduct
was neither extreme nor outrageous within the meaning of the Re-
statement of Torts § 908,83 and despite his subjective good faith.
Understandably, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently al-
lowed insurance for punitive damages in a malicious prosecution
case because
a small businessman could be crippled or virtually wiped out by
an assessment of exemplary damages in a malicious prosecution
action where he proceeded with what he regarded as good reason
to prosecute a shoplifter but the courts found that he lacked prob-
able cause for such pursuit.84
A holding finding insurability solely because of a fear of unto-
ward consequences from uninsured punitive damages is no different
from permitting coverage because of a lack of deterrent effect; both
rationales fail to explain why the award was permitted initially. One
possible explanation is that courts are bound by precedent and only
the legislature can attack punitive damages directly.85 But the usur-
pation of precedent and legislative function can be no greater when
punitive damage awards are neutralized through insurance. If puni-
tive damages are attacked indirectly by the courts in this manner,
there is no reason why the judiciary cannot limit them directly.
8 6
3. Other Grounds.-Three other grounds for allowing cover-
injury," any contract with an insurance company to provide protection against the
risk of punitive damages as the result of such conduct would become invalid as a
matter of "public policy".
Id at _, 567 P.2d at 1018-19.
82. This explanation of Maryland law is based on Justice Levine's dissent in First Nat'l
Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 248, 389 A.2d 359, 369 (1978)
(Levine, J., dissenting).
83. See note I supra.
84. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 241, 389 A.2d
359, 366 (1978). This case did not involve a small businessman but rather a bank that had
unsuccessfully initiated a criminal proceeding against a customer. See also First Nat'l Bank of
St. Mary's v. Todd, 283 Md. 251, 389 A.2d 371 (1978).
In City Products Corp. v. Globe Indem. Co., 88 Cal. App. 3d 31, 151 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1979),
the court denied insurance coverage for punitive damages in a malicious prosecution case on
public policy grounds. The California court did not consider the effect of this holding on the
small businessman even though, as in Maryland, malice would be inferred from the want of
probable cause. Thus, under California law if a jury finds that the facts do not show probable
cause, a defendant in a malicious prosecution action may be liable for punitive damages de-
spite his subjective good faith.
85. In both Harrell and First Nat'iBank the courts suggested that alternatives to punitive
damages might be best considered by the legislature. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or.
199, -, 567 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
283 Md. 228, 237, 389 A.2d 359, 364 (1978).
86. The Oregon Supreme Court has recently allowed a direct limitation on punitive dam-
ages absent a legislative enactment. In Chamberlain v. Jim Fisher Motors, Inc., 282 Or. 229,
_ 578 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1978), the court held "gross negligence or recklessness is not, in and of
itself, sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." Only five years earlier the same
age of punitive damages have been found. First, because punitive
damages are discretionary, noninsurability creates the opportunity
for unequal treatment; given two equally culpable tortfeasors, one
might receive a verdict of compensatory damages that would be cov-
ered, while the other might be forced to pay punitive damages out of
his own pocket.87 Although this argument has been criticized for
impugning the integrity of the jury system,88 it is more likely aimed,
not at juries, but at the lack of definite standards upon which juries
may act in awarding punitive damages.
Second, one commentator has relied on the bounty theory of
punitive damages. This theory is based on the reasoning that en-
couraging private suits through the prospect of a possible punitive
award for which the insurer is responsible would relieve some bur-
den from the criminal courts, especially in automobile cases.89
Last, courts have suggested that despite insurability, the
tortfeasor would nonetheless be punished by higher insurance rates
or other penalties for his conduct.9° No court, however, has claimed
any of these other grounds to be controlling on this issue.
At the core of the objections to the McNulty public policy rule is
dissatisfaction with the law of punitive damages. 9' The court in Mc-
Nulty recognized the arguments against such awards92 but correctly
decided that if precedent allowed punitive damages, then that prece-
dent should not be circumvented by insurance. Any contrary hold-
ing not only permits wasteful damage awards, but also substitutes
considerations of freedom of contract and "practical effect" for the
central issue: are punitive damages necessary? The remaining in-
quiry in this note is whether the McNulty rule admits of any excep-
tions.
court held that the wanton or reckless conduct of an intoxicated driver did furnish a basis for
punitive damages. Harrell v. Ames, 265 Or. 183, 508 P.2d 211 (1973).
87. Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 644, 653, 383 S.W.2d 1,
5, 7 (1964) (White, J., concurring). See also Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d
432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gerwin, J., concurring).
88. American Sur. Co. v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523, 527 (10th Cir. 1966).
89. Anderson, supra note 24, at 628-29.
90. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 242, 389 A.2d
359, 366 (1978); Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 103, 267 N.W.2d 595,
601 (1978). In addition, the award of punitive damages may often exceed the limits of liability
coverage. State v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., - Vt. __ 404 A.2d 101, 105 (1979).
91. This is particularly clear in Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146, 151-52
(Ky. 1974), in which the court stated, "[W]e do not deem it against public policy to allow
liability. . . to be insured against when the punitive damages are imposed for a grossly negli-
gent act. ... The court then added, "Some members of the court feel that punitive damages
are an anomaly in the law and would abolish them altogether."
92. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962) ("there is
an argument that the law should not favor punitive damages: there is enough of a punitive
element in a tort system of liability based on fault").
C Cases in Which the Public Policy Theory is Inapplicable
In several cases courts have recognized that despite the merits of
a public policy argument, insurance coverage should be granted for
damages awarded as a punishment. These holdings result from the
compensatory nature of punitive damages under state law, other
statutory policy, the vicarious nature of the liability, and other com-
peting considerations.
1. The Compensatory Nature of Punitive Damages.-Punitive
damages are generally recognized to have compensatory aspects,
93
but in some states compensation is theprimary goal.94 In Connecti-
cut, for example, punitive damages are limited to the plaintiff's liti-
gation expenses minus taxable costs.95 When compensation is the
goal, obviously public policy is advanced not thwarted, by insurance.
Similarly, if so-called punitive damages serve substantial com-
pensatory and punitive purposes concurrently, courts tend to favor
insurability. Thus, lump sum awards in which punitive damages are
included, but not distinguished, have been held to be insurable.
96
For example, under the Alabama wrongful death statute all damages
are labeled punitive,97 but since damages may be awarded in cases of
simple negligence, 98 it is difficult to argue they do not also serve a
substantial compensatory function. Therefore, punitive damages are
insurable in Alabama. 99
2. Statutory Construction.-Due to state regulation of insur-
ance, especially automobile insurance, several courts have con-
fronted the issue of whether a statute expressly or impliedly
mandates insurance coverage for punitive damages. In South Caro-
lina coverage for punitive damages is explicitly required,' ° but in
most states statutes governing insurance policies, financial responsi-
93. "[H]istorically, exemplary damages represent nonpecuniary losses such as injured
feelings, damaged reputation, humiliation, shame, pain and suffering (in certain states)."
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
94. See Long, Punitive Damages. An Unsettled Doctrine, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 870, 875
(1976).
95. Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, ___, 18 A.2d 357, 359 (1941).
96. See, e.g., Morrell v. LaLonde, 45 R.I. 112, 120 A. 435 (1923).
97. ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 6-5-410 (1975). See also Ellis v. Zuck, 546 F.2d 643 (5th Cir.
1977).
98. See Employers Ins. Co. of Ala. v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, __ 172 So. 671, 673 (1937);
Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, -, 76 So. 515, 518 (1917).
99. In American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel, 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103 (1935), the
court extended the rule that punitive damages under the death act were insurable to a situation
in which there was no wrongful death claim. The court reasoned that since the defendant's
insurance policy would cover punitive damages awarded under the death act, it would cover
other punitive damages. See also Capital Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897,
899 (1939).
100. S.C. CODE § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1975). "The term 'damages' shall include both ac-
tual and punitive damages." Id. Section 46-750.32 requires that liability insurance protect,
"against loss from liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance, or use of. . . motor vehicles. ... (emphasis added).
bility laws,' and uninsured motorist statutes 0 2 are equivocal. Such
statutes are generally construed not to require coverage of punitive
damages, and only in Texas, 10 3 Georgia' 4 and Vermont'0 5 have
contrary results been reached.
The language of some insurance laws is very broad, lacking
even the "because of bodily injury" qualification found in many lia-
bility policies. For example, the "Kansas Automobile Injury Repa-
rations Act"'0 6 requires insurance for any "loss from the liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of any . . . vehicle ... "107 Facially, this provision
seems broad enough to cover punitive damages, and, therefore, to be
declarative of the public policy of Kansas.
In American Surety Co. of New York v. Gold, 10 8 however, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreting Kansas law on an ear-
lier but similar provision, held that coverage for punitive damages
was not required. The court reasoned that because the legislative
purpose of the insurance statute was to provide compensation for
accident victims, and because punitive damages in Kansas were
meant to punish, the Kansas legislature had not intended to require
insurance for punitive damages.'0 9
A contrary result was reached by a Texas appellate court in
Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallgren. ' This court
made three findings of law: first, that a standard liability policy
should be read to include coverage for punitive damages;''' second,
that the policy language in question was approved by the state insur-
101. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 311 (McKinney Supp. 1977).
102. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727 (West 1973).
103. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
104. Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910
(1977). See note 116 infra.
105. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4203 (1979), requires an insurance company to "pay and
satisfy any judgment that may be recovered against the insured upon any claim covered by the
policy to the extent and within the limits of liability assumed thereby." In State v. Glens Falls
Ins. Co., __ Vt. __ 404 A.2d 101 (1979), the court found that a standard liability policy covered
punitive damages. Based on the above statute, therefore, the court found no public policy
against coverage.
106. KAN. STAT. § 40-3101 (1975) (providing for mandatory liability insurance).
107. Id § 40-3107(b).
108. 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
109. Id at 527. Accord Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 16 Ariz. App. 511, 494
P.2d 711, rev'd on other grounds, 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972) (financial responsibility
law held compensatory); Suarez v. Aguiar, 351 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)
(uninsured motorist act does not extend to punitive damages); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co.,
59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Dist. Ct. 1969) (financial security law held compensatory);
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964) (uninsured motorist statute
held compensatory, case subsequently overruled by S.C. CODE § 46-750.31(4) (Supp. 1975);
see note 100 supra). Cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151
(1948) (financial responsibility act held compensatory, in New Hampshire punitive damages
are compensatory).
110. 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
111. Id at 343 (citing Brin, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance, 31 INs. COUNSEL J.
265 (1964)).
ance commission;" 2 and last, that this approval was declarative of
the public policy of Texas. From these findings, the court concluded
that coverage could not be contrary to public policy.'
If the Wallgren court had construed the policy to exclude puni-
tive damages, then on the above reasoning the public policy of Texas
would have denied coverage. Thus, even assuming that the court
was correct in allowing an administrative body to control public pol-
icy, 1 " the court should have considered the intent with which the
language was used.
The Wallgren court also held that punitive damages were cov-
ered because the policy in question was required under the Texas
financial responsibility act. The court reasoned that since this act
was meant to protect the public, refusal to enforce fully the insur-
ance policy on public policy grounds would withdraw the protection
intended by the legislature.' 'l Again, this reasoning is too simplistic
because the court failed to consider whether the financial responsi-
bility law was enacted to assure recovery of punitive damages, or just
to guarantee compensation to accident victims.
1 16
Therefore, an exception to the McNulty rule can be clearly
carved out only when, as in South Carolina, a statute expressly pro-
vides coverage for punitive damages. In the absence of such a stat-
ute, however, courts should not expand general compensatory
statutes to punitive damages in the absence of legislative intent.
3. Vicarious Liability.-Under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior employers have been held vicariously liable for awards of puni-
tive damages against their employees.' '7 Several courts have
112. Id at 342 (citing United States Ins. Co. v. Boyer, 153 Tex. 415, 269 S.W.2d 340
(1954)).
113. Id
114. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 621-22.
115. The court relied upon RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 601 (1932), which provides as
follows:
If refusal to enforce or to rescind an illegal bargain would produce a harmful effect
on parties for whose protection the law making the bargain illegal exists, enforcement
or rescission, whichever is appropriate, is allowed.
116. The same reasoning is evident in Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d 910 (1977):
The Georgia Insurance Code, Code Ann. § 56-101 et seq., authorizes the issuance of
liability insurance. Code Ann. § 56-408(1) provides, "Liability insurance, which is
insurance against legal liability for . . . damage to property. ... (emphasis
added). Punitive damages is [sic] a legal liability and accordingly insurance against
such damages is expressly authorized.
Id at __ 232 S.E.2d at 914. Again, the court ignored the legislative intent as well as the
question of whether punitive damages are awarded for damage to property. Moreover, the
statute involved here was only a definitional section which was read to "authorize" not man-
date insurance of punitive damages. Mere authorization would not foreclose examination of
the scope of the insurance contract itself.
117. See Comment, Liability o/Employers/or Punitive Damages Resulting From Acts of
Employees, 54 CI-KENT L. REV. 829 (1978). This rule has been criticized as serving no func-
tion when the employer is not culpable. See, e.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note
2, at 12-13. A broad exception to this rule exists in many states for governmental employers.
circumvented this rule, however, by allowing the employer to insure
against such liability so long as he did not participate in or ratify the
wrong.'lI  Such a result does not violate public policy; the wrong-
doer remains uninsured, and there is no significant reason to punish
the innocent employer." 19
Of course, as a prerequisite to excepting vicarious liability from
the McNulty rule, the court must first broach the contractual issues
raised in section III, above. Interestingly, despite the debate engen-
dered over the scope of liability policies when the insured is prima-
rily liable, no court has narrowly construed the insurance contract to
exclude punitive damages when the insured is vicariously liable. 2 °
4. Competing Considerations.-Some courts have found that
despite the validity of the McNulty rule as a norm, certain fact situa-
tions justify deviation to satisfy competing considerations. Applying
this approach, one court has permitted insurability of statutory treble
damages,' 2 ' while another has permitted police to insure against pu-
nitive damages arising from a false arrest.'
22
State and federal statutes may impose automatic multiplying of
compensatory damages as a means to punish the defendant.
123
Under such statutes the factfinder has no opportunity to fit the pun-
ishment to the wealth of the defendant or the culpability of his con-
duct. In fact, at least some of these statutes allow damages to be
trebled regardless of culpability. 124  Hence, absent insurability, a
poor defendant whose conduct unfortunately caused severe injury
See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 579 P.2d 568 (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 59:9-2 (West
Supp. 1978).
118. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1934); Norfolk & W.
Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92, 96 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545, 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Scott v. Instant Parking Inc.,
105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. Ct. 200, 214, 224
A.2d 793, 800 (1966). But see First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283
Md. 228, 231, 389 A.2d 259, 361 (1978) (liability based on a corporate decision is direct, not
vicarious).
119. Such an award is frequently sought to be justified on the dubious theory that
vicarious liability serves the public interest by inducing employers to use greater care
in the selection and supervision of their employees. The absurdity of this make-
weight argument is apparent to anyone who has ever been in the position of offering
employment--there simply is no way to gauge whether a potential employee will
become violent when irritated, just as there is no method of determining with cer-
tainty whether he will be a good worker.
Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, in DEFENSE RESEARCH IN-
STITUTE, supra note 2, at 12-13.
120. See, e.g., Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
121. Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 267 N.W.2d 595 (1978).
122. Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968).
123. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 174.04 (West 1979) (treble damages for injuries inflicted
by dogs when the owner has notice of prior injuries). See also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (treble
damages for violations of the antitrust laws); this section was held punitive in Clark Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 148 F.2d 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
124. Cieslewicz v. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 84 Wis. 2d 91, 102, 267 N.W.2d 595, 600
(1978). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-295 (West Supp. 1979) (providing for doubling
or trebling of damages if, in the discretion of the court, such doubling or trebling is just).
would suffer greatly, while a wealthy defendant whose conduct was
extreme and outrageous might escape with light punishment.
125
In Cieslewicz v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., 126 these
distinctions between common-law punitive damages and statutory
multiple damages were held sufficient to overcome strict application
of McNulty. 127 The court placed particular emphasis on the risk that
under the statute in question treble damages could be awarded
against a nonculpable defendant. 128 While the court admitted that
some deterrence would be sacrificed by insurability, it recognized
that public policy "is no magic touchstone."'
129
The McNulty court itself left open the possibility of an excep-
tion such as this by defining punitive damages as those awarded for
"intentional or malicious wrongdoing" or other conduct of a "crimi-
nal character."' 130 By implication, when the conduct does not in-
volve any culpability beyond negligence, McNulty would not
apply. 131
A second fact situation justifying departure from strict applica-
tion of McNulty involves claims against police officers. A municipal-
ity or individual police associations may carry liability insurance for
personal injury claims arising from false arrest, detention, malicious
prosecution, and assaults and batteries alleged to have been commit-
ted in making or attempting to make an arrest. 32 Such insurance
does not contain a bodily injury clause and, therefore, may easily be
read to include awards of punitive damages. 133 Moreover, such poli-
cies may insure against damages resulting from intentional acts with-
out offending public policy if the police conduct is not in itself
criminal, extreme, or outrageous. This is based on the need to pro-




128. Id at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601. Under the statute in question the owner of a dog
could be liable for treble damages for injuries inflicted by the dog.
For the purpose of awarding treble damages under Ithis statute,] all that is necessary
is that it be shown that the dog had previously injured someone . . . and that the
owner had notice of the previous injury. Whether the dog is known to be violent and
vicious, so that the owner's conduct in not restraining the dog is extreme recklessness,
or whether the dog is normally gentle, but has had one prior incident, makes no
difference for the purpose of the statute. Treble damages are awarded in either case.
Id at 102, 267 N.W.2d at 601. This characteristic of the statute in Cieslewicz distinguishes the
case from Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941), in which statu-
tory treble damages that were awarded in the court's discretion were held uninsurable.
129. 84 Wis. 2d at 103, 267 N.W.2d at 601.
130. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442 (5th Cir. 1962).
131. This suggests that the McNully principle should not be applied in malicious prosecu-
tion cases in which punitive awards are automatically permissible despite the absence of outra-
geous conduct. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
132. See, e.g., City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537,
543, 342 A.2d 513, 516 (1975).
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tect police in the performance of their duties. 13 1
Logically, such insurance protection should also be extended to
punitive damages, but the New Jersey Superior Court and an Indi-
ana Federal District Court have ruled that neither the police nor the
municipality may insure against a direct award of punitive dam-
ages. 135  A contrary result was reached in Colson v. Lloyds of
London 136 in which the court held that the McNulty rule was inap-
plicable because,
Here we are faced with the problem of whether it would be
against public policy to permit an association of law enforcement
officers to insure themselves against alleged wilful and intentional
acts. In our opinion, it would not. It would be extremely rare,
particularly in a suit for false imprisonment where the insured
participates in the restraining or manhandling of the plaintiff, for
there not to be an assertion that this was ground for the assess-
ment of punitive damages. During the year we have seen violence
stalk the streets of our cities. And it is common knowledge that
the rate of crime throughout the country is on the increase. This
has brought about great public demand for more and better
trained law enforcement officers. What effect . . . would it have
upon qualified persons giving heed to that demand if they were
told by the courts that they could not enter into a contract which
would afford them protection. . . from claims for punitive dam-
ages? That it would tend to discourage them from entering into
that public service goes without saying.' 37
If the Colson court correctly assessed the effect of punitive dam-
age awards on police, then to deny insurance would cause a harm to
the public-the very group thatpublic policy is meant to protect.' 38
V. Conclusion
From the preceding discussion a coherent rule can be designed
to govern the insurability of punitive damages. First, based upon
possible ambiguities and the expectations of the insured, standard
liability policies should be read to allow coverage of punitive dam-
ages unless there is an express exclusion. Second, in most instances
134. City of Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 547, 342
A.2d 513, 518 (1975).
135. Grant v. North River Ins. Co., 453 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Ind. 1978); City of Newark v.
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134 N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (1975); Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 48 N.Y.2d 218 (1979). At least in the Grant case other
factors may have protected the police from punitive damages. Since the city of Fort Wayne
was also named in the action, under IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-16.5-5(a) (Bums Supp. 1978), the
action against the police was arguably barred. Furthermore, the city of Fort Wayne had as-
sumed a contractual duty to indemnify city employees for damages awarded for acts done in
good faith. 453 F. Supp. at 1371.
In contrast the New York Court of Appeals expressly stated in Village of Hempstead that
public policy does not permit insurance coverage of punitive damage awards against munici-
pal police officers in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action.
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the McNulty public policy rule should void such coverage. This is
important not only to avoid wasteful awards,' 39 but also to insure
that a wrongdoer does not escape punishment. Last, in certain lim-
ited situations the McNulty rule should be set aside in favor of per-
mitting coverage. These exceptions are present when under state law
punitive damages are substantially compensatory, when a state stat-
ute provides for coverage, when punitive damages can be awarded
without some degree of culpability, and finally, when inability to
shift the risk of punitive damages could harm the public.
139. The prospects of wasteful awards was one of three practical arguments against insur-
ability of punitives raised in Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th
Cir. 1962). The other two were the possibility of conflicts of interest between the insurer and
the insured and the possibility of conflict between the inadmissibility of evidence of insurance
and the admissibility of evidence of wealth to set punitive damages.
The McNulty decision did not state what conflicts of interest would be created by insura-
bility, but logically those conflicts should be no greater than when damages are covered by
insurance. In fact, the conflicts seem greater when insurability is denied to punitive damages.
For example, if the insurer negotiates a $5,000 settlement how can it be decided what part is
compensatory and what part is punitive? Further, when the insurer disclaims liability for pu-
nitive damages he is under a duty to notify the insured and to suggest procedures that might
limit the impact of the punitive damages on the defendant. See generally Ging v. American
Liberty Ins. Co., 423 F.2d 115, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1970); Gonsoulin, Is an Award ofPunitive
Damages Covered under an Automobile or Comprehensive Liability Policy,? 22 Sw. L.J. 433,
443-44 (1968).
Nor has the conflict between the nonadmissibility of insurance policies and the admissi-
bility of evidence of wealth created difficulties as feared in McNulty. Presumably, if punitive
damages are insurable then the insurance policy becomes admissible evidence of the defend-
ant's wealth. This could affect the jury's findings on liability and cause inflation of punitive
damages by the amount of insurance coverage. Since McNulty this problem has only been
raised twice. See Odoms v. Travelers Ins. Co., 339 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976); Svejcara v. Whit-
man, 82 N.M. 739, _ 487 P.2d 167, 169-70 (1971). Both courts found admission of the de-
fendant's insurance policies harmless error on the facts, but the Odoms court added that it was
error for the lower court to allow consideration of the insurance limits in setting punitive
damages.
